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Abstract 
This study examines the problem that a central bank may face after exiting a monetary 
quantitative easing policy. It develops a simple dynamic optimization model of a central 
bank, which finds that if the bank needs to absorb a substantial amount of excess 
reserves when exiting, the monetary base may become uncontrollable. In this case, the 
bank has no option but to increase the monetary base by more than the target amount, 
which leads to an undesirable money supply expansion and, ultimately, to inflation 
pressures. The model shows the condition when a central bank faces such a challenging 
situation. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the problem that a central bank may face after 
exiting a monetary quantitative easing policy. This paper develops a simple dynamic 
optimization model of a central bank and shows that a bank’s unsound balance sheet 
after the exit may make it challenging for the bank to avoid an undesirable monetary 
base expansion. 
 After the “Lehman shock” in 2008, many central banks in industrialized 
countries introduced unconventional measures of monetary easing policy. One of the 
main measures was quantitative easing, where central banks expanded their balance 
sheets and excess reserves drastically. When the economy recovers, a central bank 
should exit quantitative easing using an exit strategy, such as substantially shrinking the 
balance sheet and paying high interest on piled up excess reserves. 
 There is a concern that exiting quantitative easing may deteriorate a central 
bank’s balance sheet and financial strength. Stella (2003) emphasizes the importance of 
a central bank’s financial strength, and Klüh and Stella (2008) and Adler et al. (2012) 
show that central banks with weak financial strength do not perform well. Ize (2005) 
studies the financial problem of troubled central banks. Reis (2013, 2015), Hall and 
Reis (2015), and Berentsen et al. (2016) study financial stability of some central banks 
with various exit strategies for quantitative easing under several rules concerning 
dividend or fund transfers to and from governments. 
 These studies take into account the effect of a central bank’s profit on the 
balance sheet, but they do not drive the bank’s behavior from optimization. This paper 
develops a continuous time version of the dynamic optimization model proposed by 
Tanaka (2014). Using the model, this paper shows the optimal behavior of a central 
bank after exiting from quantitative easing, and shows the possibility that a bank is 
forced to expand the monetary base more than necessary. 
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the situation of the 
Bank of Japan (BOJ) as an example of quantitative easing by a central bank and 
explains the available exit strategies. Section 3 presents the model and Section 4 
discusses certain policy implications of the model. 
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2. The Bank of Japan and Exit Strategies 
2.1. Expanded Balance Sheet of the Bank of Japan 
The BOJ first introduced an unconventional monetary policy in February 1999, which 
led the policy rate to zero. Since then, it has often implemented unconventional policies, 
including quantitative easing, and it is currently taking the most aggressive “quantitative 
and qualitative easing” that started in April 2013. 
 Considering the unconventional monetary policy, the BOJ has expanded its 
balance sheet. Table 1 shows its balance sheet as at March 2018. The BOJ expanded its 
balance sheet by mainly purchasing Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs), while most of 
the supplied funds are piled up as excess reserves. 
 
Insert Table 1 around here. 
 
 When the economy recovers and quantitative easing is no longer necessary, the 
BOJ should substantially reduce the excess reserves. Otherwise, private banks would 
start using the excess reserves for lending, which would lead to money supply 
expansion, and ultimately to inflation pressures. 
 Before the BOJ started using unconventional policies in February 1999, private 
banks held a negligible amount of excess reserves. In the decade from February 1989 to 
January 1999, excess reserve was only 0.432% of the total reserves on average. Thus, 
when the economy recovers, private banks would possibly use almost all of the excess 
reserves; thus, the BOJ should absorb them to prevent this from happening. 
 
2.2. Exit Strategies 
Several exit strategies of quantitative easing are available for the BOJ. One of them is 
shrinking its balance sheet by decreasing JGB holdings. JGBs can be redeemed, but it 
takes several years to wait for a substantial amount of their redemption. Thus, although 
the bank needs to sell JGBs, it imposes a large capital loss because the interest rate rises 
at the exit, which lowers the JGBs’ price.  
 Bernanke (2009) proposes other exit strategies for such central banks, so that 
excess reserves are not used for lending. One is to absorb the reserves by using 
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fund-absorbing operation, such as reverse repo. The other is to pay interest on reserves, 
which is sufficiently high to prevent private banks from using the reserves for lending. 
However, these strategies also bring some losses to the central bank as the bank needs to 
pay high interest. 
 All of the above exit strategies deteriorate a central bank’s balance sheet and 
reduce the bank’s profit, possibly to negative. However, a sound balance sheet is 
important for central banks, and this has been studied by Stella (2003), Ize (2005), Klüh 
and Stella (2008), and Adler et al. (2012). Reis (2013, 2015), Hall and Reis (2015), and 
Berentsen et al. (2016) study financial stability of some central banks with various exit 
strategies for quantitative easing. 
 These studies take into account the effect of a central bank’s profit on the 
balance sheet, but they do not drive the bank’s behavior for optimization. The rest of 
this paper constructs the dynamic optimization model of a central bank and studies its 
monetary base control after the exit. 
 
3. Dynamic Optimization Model of a Central Bank 
3.1. Balance Sheet and Profit 
The model in this paper uses the simplified balance sheet of a central bank shown in 
Table 2. The central bank has assets A on the left side of the sheet, and has only the 
monetary base H and capital K on the right side. The bank needs to absorb RA out of H 
to exit quantitative easing. 
 
Insert Table 2 around here. 
 
 The bank has two exit strategies. One is to sell RA amount of assets, which 
shrink A and H by RA. The other is to absorb RA by using fund-absorbing operation, 
such as reverse repo. Let such a liability be denoted by L, then RA is replaced by L and 
H is decreased by L. If L is the part of reserves with high interest rate instead of reverse 
repo, then it can be considered as the exit strategy to pay high interest. 
 The bank receives revenue from interest return. The net interest return for the 
bank is 𝑟𝐴𝐴 − 𝑟𝐿𝐿, where rA and rL are the interest rates on A and L, respectively. For 
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simplicity, 𝑟𝐴 = 𝑟𝐿 = 𝑟 is assumed; thus, by letting 𝑎 = 𝐴 − 𝐿, 𝑟𝑎 = 𝑟𝐴𝐴 − 𝑟𝐿𝐿. The 
bank should pay its operating cost C, and thus its profit π is 
π = 𝑟𝑎 − 𝐶, (1) 
where 𝑟 and 𝐶 are assumed to be constant over time in this paper. 
 In many countries, a central bank’s profit is transferred to the government. For 
example, Japan has the basic rule that the BOJ adds 5% of its profit to the capital, while 
the rest is paid either as dividend to shareholders or as a transfer to the government. 
However, this rule assumes that the profit is positive and it is not clear whether the BOJ 
can receive any fiscal support in the case of negative profit. In addition, there is no 
clarity on how much fiscal support the Federal Reserve or the European Central Bank 
can receive, as pointed out by Reis (2015, 3). The model here can easily include such 
fiscal transfers and support, but assumes that there are none. The full amount of π is 
added to K: 
𝐾′ = π = 𝑟𝑎 − 𝐶, (2) 
where 𝐾′ = 𝑑𝐾 𝑑𝑡⁄  and t is time. 
 From the balance sheet and equation (2), the following is derived: 
𝑎′ = 𝐻′ + 𝐾′ = ℎ + 𝑟𝑎 − 𝐶, (3) 
where 𝑎′ = 𝑑𝑎 𝑑𝑡⁄  and ℎ = 𝐻′ = 𝑑𝐻 𝑑𝑡⁄ . Equation (3) shows how the balance sheet 
is affected over time. 
 
3.2. Dynamic Optimization 
The model in this paper examines the dynamic optimizing behavior of a central bank 
after the exit. The bank exits quantitative easing and shrinks the balance sheet to 
𝑎0 at 𝑡 = 0. After the exit, the bank minimizes the following quadratic loss function: 
min
ℎ
∫ 𝑒−𝛿𝑡 {
1
2
(ℎ − ℎ∗)2} 𝑑𝑡
∞
0
(4) 
s. t. 𝑎′ = 𝑟𝑎 + ℎ − 𝐶, (3) 
𝑎 = 𝑎0 at 𝑡 = 0, (5) 
where ℎ∗ is the monetary base increase target that is consistent with the desirable 
inflation, such as 2%. δ is the discount rate and 1 > 𝑟 > δ > 0 is assumed. Given δ, r, 
C, ℎ∗, and 𝑎0, the central bank attempts to set h for all 𝑡 ≥ 0 close to the target ℎ
∗ 
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under the restrictions (3) and (5).  
 h is a control variable and a is a state variable. The current value Hamiltonian 
ℋ is 
ℋ =
1
2
(ℎ − ℎ∗)2 + 𝑚(𝑟𝑎 + ℎ − 𝐶), (6) 
where m is the current value multiplier. The first order conditions are as follows: 
𝑑ℋ 𝑑ℎ⁄ = ℎ − ℎ∗ + 𝑚 = 0, (7 − 1)  
𝑚′ = 𝛿𝑚 − 𝑑ℋ 𝑑𝑎 =⁄ (𝛿 − 𝑟)𝑚. (7 − 2) 
Equations (7-1), (7-2), and (3) reduce to the next two differential equations. 
𝑎′ = 𝑟𝑎 + ℎ − 𝐶, (8) 
ℎ′ = (𝛿 − 𝑟)(ℎ − ℎ∗). (9) 
A steady state (ℎ𝑆, 𝑎𝑆) is 
ℎ𝑆 = ℎ
∗, 𝑎𝑆 =
𝐶 − ℎ∗
𝑟
. (10) 
 Figure 1 illustrates a phase diagram of the variables h and a. The 𝑎′ = 0 locus 
is derived from equation (8) and its slope is − 1 𝑟⁄ . a is increasing in the area to the 
right of the 𝑎′ = 0 and is decreasing in the area to its left. The ℎ′ = 0 locus is derived 
from equation (9) and it is vertical at ℎ∗. h is decreasing if ℎ > ℎ∗ and is increasing if 
ℎ < ℎ∗. The steady state (ℎ𝑆, 𝑎𝑆) is a saddle point. A central bank needs to satisfy the 
no-Ponzi game condition,  
lim
𝑡→∞
𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑎 ≥ 0, (11) 
in order to stay solvent, as discussed by Reis (2015). 
 
Insert Figure 1 around here. 
 
 The optimal paths of a are derived from equations (8) and (9) as follows: 
𝑎 = 𝛼1𝑒
𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑒
(𝛿−𝑟)𝑡 + 𝑎𝑆. (12) 
As 1 > 𝑟 > δ > 0 is assumed, only the path with 𝛼1 = 0 can reach 𝑎𝑆.  
 With the restriction (5), the optimal paths of a and h to the steady state are 
derived as follows: 
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𝑎 = (𝑎0 − 𝑎𝑆)𝑒
(𝛿−𝑟)𝑡 + 𝑎𝑆, (13 − 1) 
ℎ = −(2𝑟 − 𝛿)(𝑎0 − 𝑎𝑆)𝑒
(𝛿−𝑟)𝑡 + ℎ∗. (13 − 2) 
These equations are illustrated as the convergence locus in Figure 1. Its slope is 
− 1 (2𝑟 − 𝛿)⁄ , which is smaller than the slope of 𝑎′ = 0 locus in absolute value. 
 
4. Policy Implications 
4.1. Case of 𝑎0 < 𝑎𝑆 
Using the model constructed in Section 3, this section examines the optimal path of the 
monetary base and checks whether or not a central bank can avoid undesirable monetary 
base expansion after exiting from quantitative easing. At the exit, the bank shrinks a to 
𝑎0. This subsection examines the case where the bank needs to shrink a substantially to 
a point below 𝑎𝑆. 
 In Figure 1, such 𝑎0 is shown as 𝑎0
1. As h is a control variable, the bank can 
choose any value on the horizontal dotted line at 𝑎 = 𝑎0
1. If the bank sets ℎ = ℎ∗, then 
a starts moving toward negative, and the condition (11) does not hold. In order to avoid 
a decrease in a, the bank must increase h to reach the 𝑎′ = 0 locus, but it is not optimal 
either. The bank’s optimal behavior is to increase h further to the convergence locus. 
The no-Ponzi game condition is binding, and (11) with only an equal sign holds. It is 
now the transversality condition for the model, and the solution is shown through 
equations (13-1) and (13-2). The bank’s optimal solution only gradually moves along 
the convergence locus toward the steady state point (ℎ𝑆, 𝑎𝑆). 
 Therefore, a central bank cannot maintain a monetary base increase at the 
target ℎ∗ after the exit. It has no option but to continuously increase the monetary base 
faster for a certain period, which leads to money supply expansion and, ultimately, to 
inflation pressures.  
 The rate of return on the net assets r is given in the model, but it may become 
lower after the exit if the bank chooses an exit strategy to absorb the reserves by using 
reverse repo or to pay high interest on reserves. This is because the assets obtained 
before the exit earn low interest, while new liabilities after the exit cost high interest. It 
is expressed as an exogenous fall in r. It raises 𝑎𝑆 and makes the convergence locus 
flatter. Both of them force the bank to set h higher, and the situation deteriorates. 
8 
 
 The model assumes no fiscal support from the government to the central bank. 
In the model, if the bank receives fiscal support, which amounts to ℎ − ℎ∗, the bank can 
maintain h at ℎ∗. Thus, in the case of full fiscal support, the model shows its necessary 
amount. 
 
4.2. Case of 𝑎0 ≥ 𝑎𝑆 
Suppose the central bank need not significantly shrink its balance sheet such that 𝑎0 is 
above 𝑎𝑆. In Figure 1, such 𝑎0 is shown as 𝑎0
2. If the bank sets ℎ = ℎ∗ for all 𝑡 ≥ 0, 
the minimal value of loss function (4) is achieved. Equation (8) at 𝑡 = 0 is 
𝑎′ = 𝑟𝑎0
2 + ℎ∗ − 𝐶 ≥ 𝑟𝑎𝑆 + ℎ
∗ − 𝐶 = 0,  
as equation (10) holds. a starts with a positive value at 𝑡 = 0, and it never decreases 
throughout 𝑡 ≥ 0. a stays positive, and the condition (11) is not binding. Therefore, in 
contrast to the preceding subsection case, the bank can always set h at the target ℎ∗. 
 The discussion in this subsection shows that central banks need not be 
concerned about their balance sheet’s soundness in normal times. Generally, seigniorage 
results in a strong balance sheet, bringing more a with less H, and thus a is far above 𝑎𝑆 
in normal times. The monetary base is controllable as is assumed in many researches on 
monetary policy. 
 
4.3. Case of the Bank of Japan 
The model constructed above is now applied to the case of the BOJ described in Section 
2. Table 1 shows the amount of the net assets is 𝑎 = 𝐴 − 𝐿 = 529 − 86 = 443 trillion 
yen. For the fiscal year ending March 2018, the profit except the operating cost 𝑟𝑎 is 
1.42 trillion yen and the operating cost 𝐶 is 0.195 trillion yen. The rate of return on the 
net assets is 𝑟 = 1.42 443⁄ = 0.321%, and even if ℎ∗ = 0, 𝑎𝑆 = (𝐶 − ℎ
∗) 𝑟⁄ = 60.7 
trillion yen. On exit, if the BOJ absorbs all the 320 trillion-yen excess reserves, then 
𝑎0 = 443 − 320 = 123 trillion yen. Thus, as long as r does not fall, 𝑎0 is well above 
𝑎𝑆, and the BOJ has no difficulty in controlling the monetary base after the exit. 
 However, it may be too optimistic to assume that r does not fall. It may fall as 
the BOJ has often been purchasing JGBs with negative return since 2016 and since the 
bank may need to pay a higher interest rate on its liabilities to absorb the excess reserves. 
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If the rate of return on the net assets falls lower than 0.158%, then 𝑎𝑆 increases above 
𝑎0, and thus the BOJ starts facing challenges in keeping the monetary base unchanged. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has examined monetary base controllability after an exit from quantitative 
easing. A simple dynamic optimization model of a central bank has been developed, and 
it has been used to derive a bank’s optimizing behavior. The analysis in this paper 
provides the followings findings. 
 First, if a central bank needs to absorb a substantial amount of excess reserves 
at the exit, then there is a case that it has no option but to increase the monetary base by 
more than its target amount; the monetary base is not controllable. This is because 
issuing monetary base brings seigniorage to the bank, which helps the bank to build up 
its assets to a sufficient level. The model shows the condition when a bank faces this 
case. The model does not assume any fiscal support from the government, but if the 
bank receives such a fiscal support that equals the amount of the optimal monetary base 
increase above the target, then it can keep the monetary base increase at the target. 
 Second, if the amount of excess reserves that the bank needs to absorb is not 
substantial, it can always keep the monetary base increase at the target. This shows that 
the monetary base is controllable in normal times as is assumed in many researches on 
monetary policy. 
 The model of this paper is a simple one and can be easily expanded to include 
various elements, such as different interest rates on assets and liabilities, and fiscal 
transfer. However, these remain for future studies. 
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Table 1. The BOJ’s Balance Sheet 
 
Assets 
 (JGBs 
529 
427) 
Bank Notes 104  
 Required Reserves 10  
 
Excess Reserves 320 
 
  
  
 Other Liabilities 86  
 Capital 8  
      
 Notes:  Trillion yen. 
  Reserve figures are the averages of the reserve period, March 2018. 
  The others are at the end of March 2018. 
 Source: The Bank of Japan Homepage. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Simplified Balance Sheet of the Central Bank 
 
Assets (A) 
Monetary Base (H)  
 
 
Reserves to 
be absorbed (RA) 
 
  
  
  
 Capital (K)  
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Figure 1. Phase Diagram of h and a 
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